Gokul Ramapriyan

Power today is not defined by who you stand with—but by who must account for your position. India’s multi-alignment strategy is not hesitation—it is maturity. It reflects a belief that autonomy, not alignment, is the currency of 21st-century influence. India’s ambition is not to become a junior partner, but a Vishwaguru—a global leader charting its own course.

Proponents of deeper U.S. alignment cite economic synergies and shared concerns over China. But history complicates that assumption. During the India-Pakistan wars of 1947, 1965, and especially 1971, Washington supported Islamabad—providing intelligence and diplomatic backing. As documented in the book The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide, President Richard Nixon maintained a close relationship with Pakistan’s Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Yahya Khan, who suspended the constitution and imposed martial law in the name of restoring order (Bass 2013, 7). Nixon later deployed the USS Enterprise within a carrier battle group into the Bay of Bengal—a calculated show of solidarity with Pakistan and a warning to India against intervening in the Bangladesh liberation war, despite the mounting humanitarian crisis triggering unrest in India’s eastern states.

In 1998, India’s nuclear tests provoked swift American condemnation. And even decades earlier, President Eisenhower had conceded that the military commitment to Pakistan was “perhaps the worst kind of a plan and decision we could have made” (Gould 1996, 3080). These episodes underscore a larger truth: no power, however aligned in rhetoric, can be assumed reliable in practice. Multi-alignment is India’s hedge not against friends, but against the illusion of permanence in friendship.

Critics argue that multi-alignment dilutes India’s influence. In reality, it enhances leverage. India has compelled rival blocs to engage on its terms. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) illustrates this dynamic: despite claims of incoherence, China’s efforts to undermine it signal its relevance. Through foundational defense agreements—including the 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, 2018 Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, 2019 Industrial Security Agreement, and 2020 Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement—India gains access to American logistics infrastructure, secure communications, and geospatial intelligence, all without the entanglements of a formal alliance (Indian Embassy 2021; Ministry of Defence 2021).

The same logic applies to India’s engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While often dismissed as a China-Russia club, India has used the platform to advance core interests—from promoting the Chabahar Port to shaping trade norms through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) (Wani 2024, 3–18). Its presence in both QUAD and SCO does more than signal relevance—it creates friction for rival agendas. QUAD deters without entangling; SCO limits China’s institutional reach. In both forums, India turns participation into leverage. Exiting would mean surrendering the ability to contest from within.

This is especially relevant given China’s expanding regional footprint. Under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—a flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—Beijing has invested around US$62 billion in Pakistan. CPEC cuts through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and encircles India’s northern flank. Chabahar, just 170 kilometers from the Chinese-backed Gwadar port, is India’s counterweight: a strategic node that curbs Beijing’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean (Wani 2024, 3–18).

Economic autonomy reinforces this logic. While some claim India is “trapped” between financial systems, it has largely insulated itself from economic coercion. Western sanctions on Russia revealed how easily finance can be weaponized. Unlike Moscow, India has diversified—signing 13 free trade agreements across sectors, from agriculture and minerals with Australia to its first African FTA in 2021 with Mauritius (Rao 2025).

India’s defense strategy reflects the same principle. Though Russia remains its largest arms supplier, diversification—especially with France—has redefined India’s defense architecture. French firm Safran is co-developing an engine for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft Mk2, with full technology transfer across design, certification, and production. The partnership also strengthens India’s capabilities in metallurgy and materials science. Safran is further supporting the Multi-Role Helicopter program by transferring forging and casting technology for the Shakti engine (Prajapati 2025).

Unlike the United States—whose arms transfers impose retransfer restrictions, end-use monitoring, and even personnel tracking—France has enabled next-generation fighter jet development on more reciprocal terms (Imperial College London 2025). India is now France’s largest defense customer, accounting for nearly 30 percent of French arms exports (Wezeman et al. 2024, 6–9).

This cooperation fits within a broader procurement strategy. India fields Russian rifles, flies French Rafales, operates American and Israeli autonomous systems, and co-develops platforms like the P-75 Scorpène submarine with Mazagon Dock in Mumbai (Naval Technology 2021). This triad—legacy systems, Western integration, and domestic innovation—balances external exposure with internal capacity. Complexity is the cost of autonomy, and India has chosen to pay it.

India’s energy posture reflects the same principle. While Europe was blindsided by its dependence on Russian gas, India secured discounted Russian crude—averaging 1.75 million barrels per day in the first quarter of 2025—deepened Gulf partnerships, and expanded its investments in renewables and nuclear capacity (Sharma 2025). France is constructing the Jaitapur nuclear power plant, set to be the world’s largest and capable of powering 70 million homes (EDF India 2025).

In technology and space, India applies the same diversification strategy that defines its defense and economic posture. Like the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, India’s Semiconductor Mission and Make in India initiative aim to reduce supply chain dependencies while building long-term technological self-sufficiency. These efforts also seek to reverse a brain drain that began with the liberalization of the economy in the 1990s. As economic reforms opened global pathways, skilled professionals—especially in science and engineering—migrated to countries like the U.S. and Canada in pursuit of higher pay, advanced research environments, and clearer career trajectories (Thyagaraju 2024).

Some insist India must “choose.” John Bolton, who served as National Security Advisor during the Trump administration, argues that firm alignment with Washington is essential to counter China (Bolton 2023). But that’s a Cold War mindset in a post-Cold War world—one that would trap India in the very vulnerabilities others are now scrambling to escape.

At a guest lecture I moderated at the University of St Andrews, Major General Dev Arvind Chaturvedi of the Indian Army described India’s relationship with China as “sensitive-yet-stable”—a balance made possible by strategic flexibility. Multi-alignment is not a holding pattern; it is a launchpad. It gives India room to maneuver, space to grow, and leverage to lead.

Sanjay Gururajan

Ultimately, influence comes not from avoiding commitments but from making the right ones. India’s reluctance to align has left it without the security guarantees and economic benefits that formal alliances provide. If multi-alignment were a winning strategy, India would be setting the global agenda—not maneuvering within frameworks shaped by others.

Though multi-alignment promises flexibility, it has delivered neither decisive influence nor strategic security. India’s efforts to balance rival blocs have diluted its leverage. The claim that India counters China through SCO overlooks the reality that the organization has yielded few tangible outcomes while reinforcing Beijing’s dominance in Eurasia (Saini 2022). India’s presence has not constrained the expansion of BRI, which continues to deepen China’s economic footprint across South and Central Asia with minimal resistance from New Delhi (Jaaved 2019).

The same applies to infrastructure diplomacy. The pro-multi-alignment camp cites the Chabahar Port and INSTC as evidence of strategic depth. In reality, both face major structural constraints. INSTC remains incomplete and underfunded, limited by sanctions on Iran and Russia (Laan 2024). Meanwhile, China has secured Afghan mineral contracts and expanded ties with the Taliban. India, despite its regional ambitions, has failed to establish a comparable presence in Afghanistan’s reconstruction (Shah 2024). A strategy built on autonomy should not leave India reacting to—rather than shaping—the regional order.

Defense diversification has also proven more cumbersome than empowering. While balancing Russian, Western, and domestic platforms appears prudent, it has created logistical inefficiencies, delays, and compatibility challenges. The S-400 remains central to Indian air defense, yet its pivot to Western systems—such as the Rafale and GE-414-powered Tejas Mk2—has been slowed by bureaucratic hurdles and incomplete technology transfers. At the same time, India’s domestic defense industry lags behind operational needs, prompting emergency arms imports during crises. If multi-alignment ensured true resilience, India would not be scrambling for last-minute fixes.

Economically, India’s balancing act has not insulated it from external shocks. Rupee-based trade with Russia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia remains limited and far from supplanting the global financial networks India still relies on (Dhananjay 2023). Meanwhile, China remains deeply embedded in Indian supply chains—particularly in pharmaceuticals and electronics (Malinbaum 2025). Multi-alignment has not delivered economic sovereignty; it has left India straddling rival financial systems without fully integrating into either.

Sanjay Gururajan

India’s multi-alignment strategy aims to maximize national interests, but as global rivalries sharpen, it has left India caught between competing blocs without securing clear benefits. Closer alignment with the West is no longer just an option—it is a strategic necessity.

China’s increasingly assertive posture has exposed the limits of multi-alignment. India has avoided direct confrontation despite repeated sovereignty violations, including the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the Galwan Valley clash in 2020, which left 20 Indian soldiers dead. The QUAD, often cited as a counterweight, remains a consultative grouping, not a military alliance, which limits its deterrent value. Meanwhile, Russia—supposedly a key Indian partner—has remained silent, constrained by growing dependence on Beijing. Felix Chang, an Asia policy expert, notes, “China not only is more tightly connected to Russia, literally by pipelines and railways, but also possesses economic and technological strengths that India lacks” (Foreign Policy Research Institute 2023). Multi-alignment assumes Russia can act as a counterweight to China, yet Moscow is increasingly subordinated to Beijing.

India’s engagement with SCO has yielded little strategic leverage. Intended to expand Indian influence in Central Asia, the forum has instead served as a platform for China and Russia to advance BRI and marginalize Indian initiatives. Pakistan’s membership further constraints India’s role. Professor Harsh Pant argues, “The China-Pakistan axis will continue to limit India’s ability to shape the SCO agenda on terrorism and extremism” (ORF 2024). INSTC, often cited as a viable alternative trade route, remains underdeveloped and fragmented, further weakened by Western sanctions on Moscow and Tehran. Rather than expanding its economic footprint, India remains constrained by regional fragmentation.

Defense dependence on Russia has also eroded India’s strategic posture. Since 1971, Moscow has provided major weapons platforms, from the T-90 tank to the INS Vikramaditya. Yet as India’s military needs evolve, Russian technology has struggled to keep pace. The collapse of the fifth-generation fighter co-development project underscored Moscow’s unwillingness—or inability—to share advanced capabilities. Professor Christophe notes, “The problems of the Russian defense industry, the deterioration of Russian military technologies, and the global political situation may push New Delhi to reconsider its strategic priorities” (Poita 2022). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has only compounded this dilemma, with sanctions disrupting defense supply chains and delaying arms deliveries.

Multi-alignment has also failed to deliver financial autonomy. BRICS+, intended to challenge the Western financial system, has instead deepened China’s dominance. While members advocate de-dollarization, the renminbi remains central to the bloc’s efforts. “Data from 2022 indicated that the dollar was on one side of the trade for over 97 percent, 95 percent, 94 percent, and 88 percent of Indian rupee, Brazilian real, Chinese renminbi, and South African rand foreign exchange transactions, respectively” (Greene 2023). Despite efforts to hedge, India remains caught between American and Chinese-led financial orders rather than defining one of its own.

Regionally, multi-alignment has failed to deliver greater stability. Pakistan remains a persistent threat, using asymmetric tactics to undermine Indian security. The Pakistani state continues to finance and support militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), sustaining a cycle of low-intensity conflict. “The Pakistani state is known to create informal alliances with and between terrorist organizations and occasionally unites them. One example is the United Jihad Council (UJC), a coalition of militant groups fighting the Indian administration in J&K” (Wolf 2017). Meanwhile, China shields Pakistan diplomatically, repeatedly blocking UN resolutions against groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed, responsible for the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing—the deadliest attack on Indian security forces to date. This dynamic has made rapprochement with Islamabad nearly impossible and highlights how multi-alignment has failed to deliver meaningful diplomatic or security dividends.

India cannot afford to remain on the margins of global decision-making. Multi-alignment presumes the ability to balance indefinitely, but the international system is hardening into sharper geopolitical divides. Without deeper alignment with the West, India risks being sidelined while its adversaries consolidate power.

Gokul Ramapriyan

The absence of formal alliances does not imply the absence of power. In an era defined by fluid alignments and asymmetrical threats, India’s strength lies not in taking sides, but in compelling others to account for its position. Multi-alignment is not a posture of indecision—it is a strategy of maximized leverage.

Assertions that China’s assertiveness exposes strategic weakness overlook the deterrent structure India has already constructed. Forward-deployments along the Line of Actual Control, joint maritime patrols through QUAD, and expanded defense infrastructure reflect deliberate, interest-driven action—without entanglement in others’ conflicts (Peri 2025). Treaty-based deterrence often imports external priorities; India’s model preserves discretion over where and when it acts.

Russia’s growing tilt toward China does not erase its utility. Moscow remains a critical supplier of defense and nuclear technologies often conditioned or denied by the West. India’s ongoing relevance to Russia offers a channel of leverage—both on China and within institutions where the two converge. Abandoning the relationship would reduce Indian agency, not restore it.

Engagement within SCO is not endorsement—it is positional awareness. India remains embedded in dialogues that would otherwise be shaped without it. Presence in institutions like SCO and BRICS+ enables India to moderate outcomes, contest narratives, and deny adversaries uncontested influence. Walking away would cede institutional ground to Beijing, not diminish its reach.

Defense diversification is not a liability—it is insulation. While interoperability remains a challenge, India’s procurement model ensures it is not beholden to any single supplier. No country has offered both advanced systems and full strategic autonomy. A diversified arsenal—however complex—is a deliberate buffer against external pressure.

On financial autonomy, participation in alternative structures like BRICS+ allows India to shape discussions from within. Influence over future financial norms requires presence. Withdrawal would forfeit that opportunity and do nothing to constrain China’s role.

The persistence of Pakistan-backed terrorism despite Western cooperation demonstrates the limits of alignment as a security solution. India’s most effective responses—targeted strikes, surveillance, and disruption of financing—have been executed unilaterally, not through alliance mandates (Kaplan and Bajoria 2008).

India’s strategy does not seek equidistance—it seeks advantage. Strategic clarity does not require alignment, and flexibility is not a substitute for seriousness.

Concluding Discussion

In the end, this inquiry isn’t simply about statecraft—it’s about timing. Multi-alignment offers freedom of maneuver, but freedom only matters if used before the window closes. The pro-multi-alignment side sees India as a rule-maker in a fragmented world, setting terms rather than taking them. The opposing camp sees a nation straddling too many fences, risking irrelevance as choices harden and margins shrink.

What unites both sides is the recognition that India’s moment is approaching—and that hesitation carries a cost. The global order is shifting from fluid to fixed, from hedging to alignment. India has built ties across rival systems, diversified its defense portfolio, expanded trade, and secured a voice in forums from the QUAD to SCO to BRICS+. But does being everywhere mean shaping outcomes?

The real test is whether multi-alignment can deliver not just access, but authority. A Vishwaguru doesn’t follow the arc of history—it bends it with intent.

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